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Both schizophrenia (SCZ) and autism spectrum disorder 
(ASD) are characterized by mentalizing problems and asso-
ciated neural dysfunction of the social brain. However, the 
deficits in mental state attribution are somehow opposed: 
Whereas patients with SCZ tend to over-attribute inten-
tions to agents and physical events (“hyper-intentionality”), 
patients with autism treat people as devoid of intentions 
(“hypo-intentionality”). Here we aimed to investigate whether 
this hypo-hyper-intentionality hypothesis can be supported by 
neural evidence during a mentalizing task. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we investigated the neu-
ral responses and functional connectivity during reading oth-
ers intention. Scanning was performed in 23 individuals with 
ASD, 18 with paranoid SCZ and 23 gender and IQ matched 
control subjects. Both clinical groups showed reduced brain 
activation compared to controls for the contrast intentional 
vs physical information processing in left posterior superior 
temporal sulcus (pSTS) and ventral medial prefrontal cortex 
(vMPFC) for SCZ, and right pSTS in ASD. As predicted, 
these effects were caused in a group specific way: Relative 
increased activation for physical information processing in 
SCZ that was also correlated with positive PANNS score and 
relative decreased activation for intentional information pro-
cessing in ASD. Additionally, we could demonstrate opposed 
connectivity patterns between the right pSTS and vMPFC in 
the clinical groups, ie, increased for SCZ, decreased for ASD. 
These findings represent opposed neural signatures in key 
regions of the social brain as predicted by the hyper-hypo-
intentionality hypothesis.
Key words: autism/schizophrenia/mentalising/intention/ 
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and schizophrenia 
(SCZ) are 2 distinct neuropsychiatric disorders: ASD is 
characterized by deficits in social communication along-
side stereotyped, repetitive behaviors,1 whereas SCZ is 
characterized by a combination of positive (hallucina-
tions, delusions, and thought disorder) and negative 
symptoms (apathy, speech impairment, and flat affect).2 
Despite these evident clinical discrepancies, ASD and 
SCZ both show altered development and function of the 
social brain,3 a specialized neural network dedicated to 
social cognition. Social cognition refers to automatic and 
controlled psychological processes that support social 
interaction.4 In particular, a specific cognitive ability, 
referred to as “theory of mind” (ToM), mentalizing or 
mind-reading, allows humans to represent and attribute 
different types of mental states to others, ie, inferring 
beliefs and reading intentions. Two specific areas, the 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the right posterior 
superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) along with the adja-
cent temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) are prominently 
involved in intention reading5–7: The MPFC is activated 
in social situations, implying communicative intent and 
triadic social interaction,5,7 whereas the right pSTS/TPJ 
is engaged in processing more basic and simple intentions 
like recognizing a person’s goal.7
ASD and SCZ share cognitive behavioral and neural 
dysfunction in mind-reading.8 The over-attribution of 
intentions to other people is a key symptom in SCZ, and 
psychotic symptoms, like delusions, may reflect a failure 
of affected individuals to monitor and distinguish their 
own from represented other persons’ mental states and 
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behavior.9 A  behavioral study10 in which moving geo-
metric figures enacted various social situations showed 
poor performance for SCZ compared to typically devel-
oping individuals (TD) implying that mind-reading 
deficits might lead paranoid patients to misunderstand 
others’ intentions.11–13 Few fMRI studies in SCZ have 
tested intention reading and reported fronto-temporo-
parietal altered neural activation, although these findings 
were not consistently supported by a specific behavioral 
impairment.14–18
Individuals with ASD appear to be “mind blind,” ie, 
have difficulties to understand and read others’ mind usu-
ally performing poor in tests of mind-reading.19 The geo-
metric stimuli described above were also used for testing 
social attribution in ASD and reported a lack of spon-
taneous attribution of mental states.20 In ASD, reduced 
activation during processing of social information has 
been described in the right pSTS,21–24 as well as decreased 
fronto-temporal connectivity during mind-reading.25
Consistent with these studies, it has been hypothesized 
that ASD and SCZ thus may be located at the extreme 
ends of a cognitive architecture ranging from a mecha-
nistic hypo-intentional (to treat person as objects) to a 
mentalistic hyper-intentional (to treat objects as persons) 
mode of cognition, respectively.3,26 These opposed modes 
of cognition should be reflected by opposed patterns 
of brain activation and connectivity patterns between 
regions of the social brain. It has already been shown that 
overall brain connectivity is decreased in ASD23,27,28 but 
increased in SCZ.29
To date, no fMRI-study has directly compared ASD 
and SCZ during a mentalizing task. To address the 
hyper-hypo-intentionality hypothesis, we conducted an 
fMRI experiment in which participants had to read dif-
ferent kinds of intentions, ie, private (1 person acting) 
and communicative (2 persons interacting) with a physi-
cal (non-intentional) condition serving as a control con-
dition.6,30,31 It was demonstrated that patients with SCZ 
show a decreased differential activation (intentional 
minus non-intentional) of the MPFC and bilateral pSTS 
which, and this is relevant here, was driven mainly by 
increased activation during the (non-intentional) physi-
cal control condition.18 This is consistent with a hyper-
intentional mode of cognition. For ASD patients, known 
for a more mechanistic cognition mode, we predicted 
also reduced activation, which however should be rather 
driven by reduced activation during the mentalizing con-
dition, consistent with a hypo-intentional mode of cogni-
tion (figure 1).
In addition, 2 other predictions were tested. Based on 
previous results,18 we hypothesized that differences in 
neural function would be evident primarily in more com-
plex social (communicative) intention reading compared 
to more simple (private) intention reading. This hypoth-
esis is based primarily on our previous study in patients 
with SCZ who showed no aberrant activation patterns 
in simple, but only in complex intention reading.18 
Furthermore, we aimed to explore whether the assumed 
differences between groups would also be reflected in 
opposed connectivity patterns of the right pSTS, a key 




We included 23 right-handed patients (2 females) with 
ASD aged 14–33 years, mean IQ (SD) 105.9 (13.93). We 
also included 18 right-handed individuals (4 females) 
with paranoid SCZ, aged 14–32  years, mean IQ (SD) 
101.4 (12.37). Twenty-three right-handed TD partici-
pants (4 females), aged 15–27 years, mean IQ (SD) 106.8 
(10.9), were recruited from the community. The study was 
approved by the local ethics committee. Written informed 
consent was obtained from the subjects and their parents 
(for subjects <18  years). For more details about the 3 
groups see supplementary material.
Experimental Design
We used a picture sequencing task similar to18,31 with a 
total of 30 comic strips shown via goggles, (each of 15 s 
duration) with a jittered inter-trial interval of 7–11 s show-
ing a fixation-cross. Each comic strip included 2 phases. 
In Phase 1 (the story-phase) 3 pictures (3 s each) depict-
ing an unfolding story plot were displayed sequentially. 
During Phase 2 (the choice-phase) 3 answer pictures were 
presented simultaneously (6 s). The participants’ task 
was to choose via button press the picture showing the 






Fig. 1. A schematic illustration of predicted neural signatures for 
the hyper-hypo-intentionality hypothesis. The plots represent a 
priori predicted patterns of activations in mind-reading relevant 
regions according to the hypo-hyper-intentionality thesis. For 
TD we predict increased significant activation for the intention 
condition compared to the control condition. For both patient 
groups we predict opposed dysfunctional activations: Relatively 
reduced activation for the intention condition in ASD (hypo-
intentional) and relatively increased activation for the control 
condition in SCZ (hyper-intentional).
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following 2 experimental conditions: (1) Private intention 
(PInt) representing a person’s intention with regard to 
her/his own action and plans, eg, observing a single per-
son changing a broken bulb in order to read a book. (2) 
Communicative intention (CInt) representing the inten-
tion to communicate conveyed by communicative ges-
tures, eg, observing a person requiring another person for 
a glass of water. In the control condition (third condition: 
physical causality or PhC), the comic strip showed non-
intentional causal links among objects, eg, a ball blown 
by a gust of wind knocking over and breaking a glass 
of water.
In order to perform the task in the PInt and CInt 
conditions, it was necessary to read the intention of the 
characters. In the Ph-C condition (our control condition) 
the participants viewed scenes showing non-intentional 
causal links among objects, eg, a rock is rolling down a 
hill hitting a fence.
The experimental protocol was administered in 1 ses-
sion (10 trials per condition) in pseudo-randomized order. 
Before scanning, each participant was trained outside the 
scanner with different comic strips for each category.
Behavioral Statistics
Descriptive statistics were calculated by χ2 and t-tests as 
appropriate. Participants’ reaction times and response 
accuracy were measured during scanning (for technical 
reasons, we collected behavioral data for 21 ASD subjects 
only). Data were analyzed with SPSS Statistics 17.0 by 
1-way ANCOVA with age as a covariate (the SCZ group 
was older than the ASD and TD groups) and subsequent 
comparisons between means, using Bonferroni’s post hoc 
test (P < .05).
Imaging Parameters
FMRI data were collected using a 3-Tesla Siemens 
Allegra scanner. Functional images were acquired using 
an echoplanar imaging (EPI) sequence. We obtained 384 
whole brain scans. One volume consisted of 30 slices 
(slice thickness 3 mm + 0.75 mm gap, FOV  =  192 mm, 
repetition time = 2 s, echo time = 30 ms, 64 × 64 matrix, 
flip angle 80°).
Data Analysis
Data Preprocessing. The first 4 volumes were discarded 
in order to allow for T2-equilibration. Data preprocess-
ing and statistical analyses were carried out with SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8) follow-
ing a standard sequence:
Data were realigned, normalized with a voxel size of 2 mm 
× 2 mm × 2 mm and smoothed with an 8-mm Gaussian fil-
ter. For each trial, the variance of each voxel was estimated 
according to the general linear model. Intrinsic autocorre-
lations were accounted for by the first-order autoregressive 
AR(1) process, and low-frequency drifts were removed via 
a high-pass filtering (128 s).
ROI Analysis. This study based on a region of interest 
(ROI) analysis. Our ROIs were defined using an indepen-
dent localizer “ToM” task35 in order to select 4 inde-
pendent ROIs (ventral and dorsal MPFC, right and left 
pSTS). For more details for the localizer task and ROIs 
definition, see supplemental material. The rationale for 
the selection of these ROIs is based on the relevance of 
these regions considered to be the key brain areas dur-
ing mind-reading.6–8 Furthermore, based on our previous 
results, the MPFC and the bilateral pSTS were the unique 
brain regions showing aberrant activation in SCZ during 
an intention’s reading.18
The first-level regression model consisted of 3 predic-
tors defined for each condition (PhC, PInt, and CInt) 
modeled as an event (15 s) and convolved with the hemo-
dynamic response function and 6 regressors describing 
residual motion.
In a second-level random effects group analysis, individ-
ual regionally specific effects of conditions for each subject 
were compared using a 3 × 3 full factorial design (ANOVA) 
with condition and group as factors resulting in a t-statistic 
for every voxel. We also included an additional covariate 
“Age.” The significance threshold was set to P < .05 (k > 
15)  familywise error corrected for multiple comparisons 
within the a priori-defined regions of interest (right and 
left pSTS, ventral and dorsal MPFC) provided by the main 
effect activation of the localizer experiment. In order to 
compare the mean activations pairwise per condition, indi-
vidual peak voxel data within the ROIs were extracted from 
the respective regressor and region and were subsequently 
analyzed externally using SPSS Statistics 17.0. Anatomical 
regions are reported according to standard atlases.36,37
Functional Connectivity
We performed a functional connectivity analysis (fcMRI 
analysis) in order to explore the extent to which the right 
pSTS is connected to the rest of the brain during inten-
tion reading. A  seed-based correlational analysis was 
performed using the CONN-fMRI functional connectiv-
ity toolbox (http://web.mit.edu/swg/software.htm)38 and 
SPM8. After preprocessing, data were band-pass filtered 
(0.01 Hz < f < inf Hz). Functional connectivity for each 
subject was examined during each trial. Regressors of no 
interest included the first-order derivatives of the 6 motion 
parameters, the 3 main condition effects (PhC, PInt, and 
CInt) as well as the eigenvectors from a principal com-
ponent analysis on the white matter and cerebrospinal 
fluid voxels. Correlation maps were produced by extract-
ing the residual BOLD time course from the seed region 
and computing Pearson’s correlation coefficients between 
the time course of the right pSTS and the time courses of 
all other voxels of the brain. Correlation coefficients were 
converted to normally distributed scores using Fisher’s 
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transformation to allow for second-level GLM analyses. 
The resulting contrast images were entered into a random-
effects ANOVA included an additional covariate “Age.”
GLMs were calculated using the contrast images reflect-
ing the connectivity change of the CInt and PhC condi-
tions for the 3 groups. In fact, due to the functional results 
with no differences for the PInt>PhC, we performed the 
fcMRI group analysis for the CInt>PhC contrast only. 
Results were considered significant using an uncorrected 
P < .001 (k > 15) corrected for multiple comparisons.
Results
Behavioral Performance
For response accuracy we found a group effect 
[F(2,58) = 8.13; P = .001] (ASD made more errors), but 
no effect of condition [F(2,58)  =  0.79; P  =  .46] or any 
interaction [F(4,88) = 0.92, P = .46]. For reaction times we 
found a group effect [F(2,58) = 3.42; P = .04] (SCZ were 
slower), but again no effect of condition [F(2,58) = 1.27; 
P = .29] or any interaction [F(2,58) = 0.86; P = .49]. See 
also supplementary table 2.
Functional Imaging Results
When comparing each intentional condition (PInt and 
CInt) with the physical control condition (PhC), differ-
ences in activation patterns between groups were found 
driven by specific aberrant activation within the 4 ROIs in 
pair-wise comparisons as predicted (table 1).
TD Vs Patients With Paranoid SCZ. For PInt>PhC, no 
difference was observed between groups. For CInt>PhC, 
the TD group compared to the SCZ group showed higher 
activation in the left pSTS and ventral MPFC (table  1 
and figure 2A).
In order to test the hypothesis of “hyper-intentionality” 
in the SCZ group and to replicate our results,18 the mean 
activation per condition in both groups in vMPFC was 
extracted and analysed externally in order to test by which 
differences the group by condition effects were driven. 
Note that we do not claim P-values for the interaction 
contrast itself  to be a significant finding, as this would 
be double dipping—the interaction was found to be sig-
nificant already in the ROI analyses on a FWE-corrected 
level in SPM. The TD group showed increasing activation 
from PhC < PInt < CInt. In contrast, SCZ showed similar 
activation for PhC and for both experimental conditions 
(PInt and CInt) (figure 2A). Comparing directly the con-
trol condition (PhC) in controls and SCZ in a post hoc 
t-test, a strong difference between groups was observed 
(P = .002). Similar results were found for left pSTS acti-
vation (P = .001). Moreover, the SCZ group correlation 
analysis revealed that PhC activation in vMPFC cor-
related positively with the PANSS total score (r  =  .73, 
P  =  .01) (figure  2A). To summarize, the SCZ group 
revealed dysfunctional activation in vMPFC and left 
pSTS and these dysfunctional activations were primarily 
done by an increased activation in the control condition 
(Ph-C). For the vMPFC this abnormal activation in Ph-C 
was positively associated with the degree of illness.
TD Vs Patients With ASD. No difference was observed 
between TD and ASD for the contrast PInt>PhC. 
Instead, decreasing neural activation for CInt>PhC in the 
right pSTS was observed for ASD (table 1 and figure 2B). 
In order to test the hypothesis of “hypo-intentionality” 
in the ASD group mean activation per condition in both 
groups in the right pSTS was extracted and analyzed 
externally. Comparing directly the CInt condition by a 
post-hoc t-test in controls and ASD, CInt showed less 
activation in ASD (P = .0056).
ASD Vs SCZ. No differential activation for the con-
trast PInt>PhC was observed. In the CInt>PhC contrast 
ASD showed more activation in dMPFC compared to 
SCZ. The inverse contrast (SCZ>ASD) did not reveal 
any difference (table 1 and figure 2C).
In order to test the hypothesis of “hypo-intentionality” 
and “hyper-intentionality,” mean activation per condition 
in the dMPFC ROIs of ASD and SCZ were extracted 
and analyzed externally. Similar as reported above, the 
respective plots indicate increasing significant activation 
in the PhC condition for the SCZ group (P = .0021).
fcMRI SEED-Analysis. Functional connectivity analy-
ses with the right pSTS (the seed region) was performed 
Table 1. Coordinates and Anatomic Localization for the ROI 
Analysis (Within and Between Analysis)
PInt vs PhC CInt vs PhC
x y z Z x y z Z
Control
Posterior STS 60 −54 18 5.5 56 −56 20 Inf
−58 −62 20 5.15 −58 −58 20 Inf
Ventral MPFC 2 48 −18 6.26
Dorsal MPFC 0 56 32 3.97
SCZ
Posterior STS 54 −60 10 5.11 52 −60 12 6.49
ASD −58 −52 16 5.62
Posterior STS 56 −60 10 5.11 60 −52 14 Inf
−58 −50 18 Inf
Ventral MPFC 0 46 −20 6.31
Dorsal MPFC −4 54 34 5.92
CONTROL vs SCZ
Posterior STS −46 70 16 3.98
Ventral MPFC 6 48 −20 3.91
CONTROL vs ASD
Posterior STS 60 −48 −2 3.95
ASD vs SCZ
Dorsal MPFC −4 54 34 4.22
Note: STS, superior temporal sulcus; MPFC, medial prefrontal 
cortex; SCZ, schizophrenia; ASD, autism spectrum disorder.
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Fig. 2. Interaction of mentalizing (CInt>PhC) for TD>SCZ (A), TD>ASD (B), and ASD>SCZ (C). (A) Bar plots indicate effect sizes at 
the peak voxel in MPFC and left pSTS for all conditions in TD and SCZ. The amount of MPFC activation for PhC in the SCZ correlated 
positively with the total positive PANSS score (r = 0.73, P = .001). (B) Bar plots indicate effect sizes at the peak voxel in right pSTS for all 
conditions in TD and ASD. (C) Bar plots indicate effect sizes at the peak voxel in dMPFC for all conditions in ASD and SCZ. ROI analysis 
P < .05 FWE corrected (k > 15). Dashed rectangles indicate the beta parameters for PhC and CInt. Blue: TD; Red: ASD; and Green: SCZ.
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to identify connected voxels whose activation showed a 
stronger response during CInt>PhC. Whole brain analy-
sis revealed different regions of the social brain connected 
to the right pSTS that responded more strongly to CInt 
than PhC (table 2).
The control group showed increasing connectivity dur-
ing CInt compared to PhC with vMPFC and dMPFC, 
bilateral TPJ, bilateral pSTS, right temporal pole, bilat-
eral fusiform gyrus (FG), left supplemental motor area 
(SMA), and bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). The SCZ group exhibited functional coupling 
to fewer areas: left pSTS and temporal pole, right FG, 
right DLPFC, and left inferior frontal gyrus. In ASD 
the right pSTS showed increased connectivity with the 
bilateral TPJ, right FG and left pSTS. In the between-
group comparison, group differences were found for con-
trol group vs SCZ in connectivity strength of the pSTS 
with vMPFC. During PhC the right pSTS was more 
strongly coupled with the vMPFC in patients with SCZ 
(figure 3A). In contrast, the ASD group showed less con-
nectivity between the right pSTS and vMPFC, not in 
the physical but during the intentional condition (CInt) 
(figure 3B).
To summarize, the right pSTS was dysfunctional con-
nected with the vMPFC in both patients group. In par-
ticular for the SCZ group the abnormal connection was 
primarily apparent by increased connectivity strength in 
the control condition (Ph-C), whereas for the ASD group 
the anomaly was primarily done by reduced connectivity 
strength in the communicative intention.
Discussion
This is the first study comparing SCZ and autism with 
regard to the neural signatures of their mindreading 
deficits using fMRI. In a task specifically designed for 
reading different kind of intentions, we observed group 
specific activation and connectivity patterns in and 
between key regions of the social brain in line with the 
hyper-hypo-intentionality hypothesis. These were appar-
ent only during complex social interactive but not during 
simple mentalizing conditions.
At the behavioral level, the ASD group showed over-
all reduced accuracy, whereas the SCZ group showed 
overall increased reaction times. Other studies reported 
similar findings, namely no specific behavioral impair-
ments but specific neural deviances.14,15,18 Since we only 
observed a significant main effect, but no interactions, we 
cannot state that the observed behavioral effects are spe-
cific to mind-reading. Rather, they may reflect additional 
difficulties in both patient groups beyond the ability to 
read intention. An alternative explanation could be that 
these results are the consequence of the different way of 
intention processing: hyper-intentionality leads SCZ to 
attribute intentions to objects, hypo-intentionality leads 
ASD to treat persons as objects. In both cases, the stance 
toward persons and objects could be altered in a group 
specific way but the result may be the same: to handle 
persons and objects in a similar way.
At the neural level, the SCZ group showed aberrant 
activation in vMPFC and left pSTS (figure  2A), core 
regions of the mentalizing network. Moreover, this was 
due mainly to increased activation in the control condi-
tion. In line with the hyper-intentionality hypothesis, 
patients with paranoid SCZ seem to process information 
about physical processes on the neural level in a similar 
way as information about mental states. Such an “inten-
tion detector” may become hyper-active in paranoid 
thinking as it is characteristic for SCZ.39 These neural 
findings replicate our results reported in an indepen-
dent patient group,18 and they are also consistent with 
behavioral evidence that demonstrated that SCZ attrib-
uted intentions to objects.,12 Likewise confirming our 
results, in a recent study on action observation40 hyper-
activation in the ToM-network (in pSTS and MPFC) was 
reported in patients with SCZ during a non-social condi-
tion. Furthermore, the fact that activation in the MPFC 
was correlated with the degree of positive symptoms 
lends some additional support to our interpretation and 
Table 2. Seed-Based (Right pSTS) Connection Table for 
CInt>PhC (Within and Between Analysis)
CInt vs PhC
x y z Z
Control
TPJ 66 −52 24 4.17
−54 −68 20 4.28
Temporal pole 50 −14 −16 4.15
Posterior STS 58 −36 −4 3.72
−54 −40 −4 4.03
Dorsal MPFC 6 52 32 3.9
Ventral MPFC −10 58 −18 3.71
Fusiform gyrus 44 −56 −24 3.54
−36 −46 −30 4.09
Dorso lateral prefrontal cortex 58 22 30 3.87
−50 6 38 3.59
Supplemental motor area −6 2 54 4.22
SCZ
Temporal pole −56 −38 −6 4.11
Posterior STS −56 −60 10 3.72
Fusiform gyrus 46 −46 −32 3.89
Inferior frontal gyrus −56 20 6 4.24
Dorso lateral prefrontal cortex 40 8 28 4.04
ASD
Posterior STS −62 −46 8 3.55
Fusiform gyrus 50 −50 −20 5.43
Anterior temporal pole 50 10 −32 4.22
Temporal pole −64 −34 6 4.08
Control vs SCZ
Ventral MPFC −6 54 −24 3.37
Control vs ASD
Ventral MPFC 10 54 −10 3.81
Note: STS, superior temporal sulcus; MPFC, medial prefrontal 
cortex; SCZ, schizophrenia; ASD, autism spectrum disorder.
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confirms an association between paranoid symptoms and 
abnormal brain activation during reading of intent and 
agency.40,41 This neurocognitive bias could be related to an 
exaggerated attentional focus on single visual elements in 
an observed social interaction, resulting in an incorrect 
reading of the social interaction itself.42 An alternative 
explanation is related to the strong decoupling difficul-
ties of paranoid patients, which preclude them from dif-
ferentiating between mental states belonging to different 
agents.18 Further evidence comes from connectivity anal-
yses of our data demonstrating that a core region of the 
mind-reading network, the right pSTS, showed stronger 
coupling to a second key region of the mind-reading net-
work (vMPFC) compared to TD (figure 3A) again during 
the control condition.
The ASD group also showed group differences in acti-
vation within the right pSTS when inferring communi-
cative intentions (figure 2B). However, in contrast to the 
SCZ group, in ASD this difference was driven mainly by 
less activation during the experimental, ie, CInt condi-
tion. This finding is exactly what we predicted for ASD 
based on the hypo-intentionality hypothesis. Behavioural 
studies in ASD showed that mental states are often 
processed similar to physical states of objects.20 Also 
eye-tracking data during video-clips viewing showed 
that individuals with ASD did not focus on the interac-
tive actors but on irrelevant physical information pres-
ent on the scene.43 Deviant activation of pSTS in ASD 
subjects during social cognition is well documented (for 
review see)44 and abnormal activation in ASD subjects 
was reported when they observed geometric forms that 
elicit mind-reading21 (whereas SCZ reported opposite 
results). Its abnormal involvement is described also for 
a variety of indicators of social information processing 
such as eye gaze, language perception, and joint atten-
tion.22,45,46 An fMRI study revealed that ASD responded 
to faces similarly as to objects.47 Additional evidence for 
the hypo-intentional hypotheses comes from our connec-
tivity findings with decreased connectivity between right 
pSTS and vMPFC in patients with ASD (figure 3B) in 
line with the literature supporting hypo-connectivity in 
ASD23,25: Hypo-connectivity might result from a lack of 
early social experiences due to disturbed early develop-
mental mechanisms involved in social cognition.48
Few behavioural studies on social cognition directly 
compared SCZ and ASD revealing inconsistent 
results.49–51 One behavioural study using a huge number of 
participants, found that ASD showed reduced perception 
of agency, whereas SCZ showed increasing perception 
of agency in human but also in other entities (animals 
and objects).52 Inconsistent results come also from brain 
volumetric studies: A meta-analysis study reported simi-
lar brain volumes between ASD and SCZ, but also clear 
distinctions.53 In 2 different EEG-studies using the same 
paradigm, ASD and SCZ were separately tested regard-
ing their social-emotional abilities54,55 revealing overlap-
ping but opposite results (reduced Mu suppression in 
ASD and larger Mu suppression in SCZ). To our knowl-
edge, only one imaging study on social cognition, namely 
during processing of trustworthy faces, compared both 
groups directly: ASD and SCZ reported similar hypo-
activation in right amygdala, FG and left ventro-lateral 
prefrontal cortex.56 The authors argued for “deficit spe-
cific” rather than disorder specific abnormality. In our 
study, the SCZ group seems to be more affected on the 
neural level compared to ASD (figure 2C). The available 
data from the literature make it hard to delineate which 
psychopathological syndrome should be more affected. 
Fig. 3. Group × connectivity interaction. Connectivity was calculated using the right pSTS as a seed region (ANOVA second-level for 
CInt>PhC, P = .001 uncorrected, k > 15). (A) Group differences in connectivity strength for TD (blue) versus SCZ (green) for PhC. (B) 
Group differences in connectivity strength between TD (blue) vs ASD (red) for CInt.
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We speculate that the presence of positive symptoms in 
the SCZ group might elicit more disruption on reading 
intentions,57 and although a general mind-reading deficit 
is described in ASD,19 a specific intention reading deficit 
in ASD is not well documented.58
Clearly, there are several limitations to this study. A sub-
group of the patients with SCZ and 1 patient with ASD 
were treated with atypical neuroleptics. Therefore, we can-
not exclude that medication effects interfere with the inter-
pretation of our findings. Additionally, the age range of our 
sample was rather large: Participants with SCZ were older 
than TD and ASD participants. Although age effects were 
partialled-out in all analyses, confounding influences of 
age on group comparability cannot definitely be excluded. 
Taken these limitations into account, we conclude that 
group differences in neural activation during intention 
reading in ASD and SCZ depend on the type of intention 
(communicative or private). Moreover, the group differ-
ences in brain activation and the results of our connectiv-
ity analyses are consistent with the idea that mind-reading 
problems in SCZ are due to an overactive intention-detec-
tion module, whereas mind-reading problems in ASD are 
rather due to an underactive intention-detector module.
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Supplementary material is available at http://schizophre 
niabulletin.oxfordjournals.org.
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